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INTRODUCTION
This Article considers First Amendment Internet exceptionalism.
I use that term in what I think is a reasonably standard way to
refer to the question of whether the technological characteristics of
the Internet (and, more generally, twenty-first-century information
technologies) justify treating regulation of information dissemina-
tion through the Internet differently from regulation of such
dissemination through nineteenth- and twentieth-century media,
such as print, radio, and television. My aim here is not to provide an
answer to that question, but to identify several subquestions whose
answers must be part of the larger answer.
I begin with a disclaimer. After thinking and writing about
general constitutional law and theory for many years, I began to
think about the First Amendment relatively recently, and about the
implications of that Amendment for the Internet even more recent-
ly. With so much specialized writing about the Internet and the
First Amendment already produced, I should note that my reflec-
tions on the possibility of Internet exceptionalism might simply be
reinventing the wheel—that is, discussing in quite summary form
matters that have been discussed in more detail elsewhere.1 The
fact that the term “Internet exceptionalism” is well known in the
field indicates that much has indeed been said about the questions
I discuss here.2 Still, I have not found a crisp statement presenting
many of the matters I find of interest in a single place, so the Article
1. Further, in my discussions of doctrine in this Article, I offer rather summary versions
of what I believe to be the best understanding of current doctrine, without dealing with a
rather large number of qualifications that a more complete treatment would add to deal with
a fair number of cases that do (in my view) little more than add some bells and whistles to the
core doctrines. 
2. A LEXIS search for “Internet exceptionalism” conducted on September 10, 2014, recov-
ered forty-nine items. See, e.g., Mark McCarthy, What Payment Intermediaries Are Doing
About Online Liability and Why It Matters, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1037, 1040 (2010)
(“[I]nternet exceptionalism is still a widely held viewpoint.”). Because this is a short Article,
I do not address in detail the many good articles dealing with both discrete subissues that
arise in connection with Internet exceptionalism, or those dealing expressly with Internet
exceptionalism as such. My sense is that the issues I address here have typically been
embedded in arguments focused on more detailed questions.
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may have some value as such a compilation even if it is not all that
original.
Coming to the topic from general constitutional theory and law,
I believe that I am somewhat more sensitive than most of those who
write on the subject to the question that pervades the entire field.
That is the question of the appropriate degree or form of judicial
deference to legislative regulatory interventions, whether those
interventions occur in the material economy or in the information
economy. Not surprisingly, scholars who focus almost exclusively on
the Internet and the First Amendment, to the exclusion of general
constitutional theory and law, simply assume that relatively intru-
sive judicial supervision of regulatory decisions dealing with the
information economy is appropriate.3 To the extent that the schol-
arship adverts to the question of judicial deference, I believe that it
tends to assume that the question is adequately answered by refer-
ring to Footnote Four of United States v. Carolene Products4 and the
scholarship of John Hart Ely.5 My view is that such an assumption
is not warranted. I defend this view only indirectly by attempting to
identify why and how the question of judicial deference is a complex
one.6
After the description in Part I of some general questions about
the structure of constitutional doctrine, Part II examines two
strategies that courts have used to deal with technological innova-
tions—one allowing legislative experimentation until experience
accumulates, the other imposing existing (or what I call “standard”)
doctrine from the outset. Part III looks at some attributes that are
3. For a somewhat more extended version of this point, see Mark Tushnet, Introduction:
Reflections on the First Amendment and the Information Economy, 127 HARV. L. REV. 2234,
2237 (2014). There I argue that most scholars who write about the First Amendment “like”
the Amendment, meaning that they favor relatively broad limitations on legislative power
dealing with speech. For myself, I neither like nor dislike the First Amendment in that sense.
4. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
5. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
6. A short general version of my position is this: Footnote Four and Ely are concerned
with regulations that, in Ely’s terms, threaten to block the channels of political change. See
id. at 105 (“Clearing the Channels of Political Change”). But, not all regulation of information
dissemination poses such a threat. A more disaggregated analysis of the targets of regulation,
one that attends to the extent to which those targets do in fact have much, if anything, to do
with enabling political change, is required. For an extended essay on this topic, see Mark
Tushnet, Art and the First Amendment, 35 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 169 (2012).
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said to distinguish the Internet from traditional media—norms,
scope, cost, and anonymity—with the aim of mapping out how or
when Internet exceptionalism might be justified. Part IV discusses
several general qualifications to the preceding analysis, involving
doctrinal structure yet again, the First Amendment’s bearing on
regulation of business models, and the state action doctrine. Finally
in a brief conclusion, I suggest that framing the discussion as one
about Internet exceptionalism in a broad sense is misleading.
I. WHY—OR WHY NOT—INTERNET EXCEPTIONALISM: SOME
PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
Considering the use of sound amplifying equipment by trucks
cruising city streets to disseminate a political message, Justice
Robert Jackson wrote, “The moving picture screen, the radio, the
newspaper, the handbill, the sound truck and the street corner ora-
tor have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers. Each, in my
view, is a law unto itself.”7 To that, we can now add the Internet. So,
for example, the cost of distributing information, whatever its
nature, over the Internet is much lower than the cost of doing so in
other media, particularly when the distributor uses one of the vari-
ous social networks as an intermediary. It is somewhat easier to
distribute information “anonymously” over the Internet in the sense
that the steps one must take to identify the speaker may be more
complicated or “techy” than the steps one must take to identify the
person responsible for a leaflet or television advertisement.
Justice Jackson’s observation rests on a proposition about the
form that First Amendment doctrine takes.8 For him, the constitu-
tionality of specific regulations depends upon an assessment of
“values, abuses and dangers”—that is, on what his generation would
have called a balancing of interests and what today might be called
a determination of the regulation’s proportionality.9 Whether that
7. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 98 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
8. A note about originalist approaches to the interpretation of the First Amendment
seems appropriate. To state the conclusion of a complex argument: originalists must deal with
the issues of balancing versus categorical approaches as they pursue their inquiries, though
the discourse of originalism has developed its own terms to refer to balancing and categorical
approaches.
9. The primary expositor of proportionality analysis, including in connection with the
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form was the correct one was contested at the time, with Justice
Hugo Black notably asserting that First Amendment doctrine
should be more categorical,10 and is even more contested today.11 My
argument in this Part is that the alternative forms of regula-
tion—categorical rules or balancing tests—can be indistinguishable
in practice, at least when each is done carefully. Essentially, a well-
designed set of categorical rules will identify a large range of charac-
teristics whose presence in varying degrees triggers the application
of discrete rules within the set, and well-performed balancing will
take precisely those same characteristics into account and give them
appropriate weights in generating outcomes.
For analytical clarity, we should pry apart the two elements
Justice Jackson combined. We might want to develop separate rules
for each medium of information dissemination, or we might apply a
general balancing or proportionality test to every medium. We
might call the rule-based approach one of Internet exceptionalism12
and the balancing approach a unitary account of the First Amend-
ment.
Balancing can produce the following outcome: a regulation that
would be constitutionally impermissible if invoked against print
media would be constitutionally permissible when invoked against
Internet dissemination.13 That might look like Internet exceptional-
ism on the level of outcomes, but it would result from a unified
approach to First Amendment problems.
First Amendment, is Justice Stephen Breyer. For a discussion of Justice Breyer’s First
Amendment jurisprudence, see Mark Tushnet, Justice Breyer and the Partial De-
doctrinalization of Free Speech Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 508 (2014).
10. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concurring) (“I read
‘No law ... abridging’ to mean no law abridging.”).
11. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (“The Government thus
proposes that a claim of categorical exclusion should be considered under a simple balancing
test: ‘Whether a given category of speech enjoys First Amendment protection depends upon
a categorical balancing of the value of the speech against its societal costs.’ As a free-floating
test for First Amendment coverage, that sentence is startling and dangerous.” (citations
omitted)).
12. Note that when transforming Justice Jackson’s approach into a categorical one, we
might develop—as indeed some suggest we have—“broadcast” exceptionalism, “movie”
exceptionalism, and even “book” exceptionalism.
13. And vice versa: a constitutionally permissible regulation of the print media might be
constitutionally impermissible if applied to dissemination on the Internet.
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One might think that a rule-based analytic approach could not
have similar distinct results. Professor Jim Chen provides a useful
formulation, in his discussion of regulation of Internet intermediar-
ies, which he calls conduits: “Conduit-based regulation of speech is
a constitutional mirage.... Conduit-based regulation raises precisely
the same issues as all other decisions reviewable under the First
Amendment.”14 Reno v. ACLU exemplified this approach by applying
existing rule-based doctrines in a challenge to the constitutionality
of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), which restricted the
distribution of some sexually explicit but nonobscene materials via
the Internet.15 According to the Court, “the CDA is a content-based
blanket restriction on speech, and, as such, cannot be ‘properly
analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation.’ ”16
Yet, as Chen observes immediately after stating the general
point, “distinct conduits raise distinct regulatory concerns, ranging
from strictly physical characteristics to economic predictions re-
garding markets that exploit that conduit. Persuasive free speech
jurisprudence considers differences of this sort.”17 So, we would
apply existing, pre-Internet doctrine (no Internet exceptionalism),
but with some adjustments, or “tweaks,” to take account of the
Internet’s distinct characteristics (Internet exceptionalism).18 And,
as I suggested at the outset, the choice of doctrinal structure need
have no impact on the outcomes generated. Internet exceptionalism
and standard doctrine with tweaks could produce the same “rules.”19 
14. Jim Chen, Conduit-Based Regulation of Speech, 54 DUKE L.J. 1359, 1450 (2005).
15. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
16. Id. at 868 (citations omitted). 
17. Chen, supra note 14, at 1450; see also Richard Epstein, Privacy, Publication, and the
First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1003,
1006 (2000) (“[T]he advent of cyberspace may raise the stakes, but it hardly follows that it also
changes the correct solutions.”).
18. I note that the possibility that balancing and rules-based approaches will in practice
result in the same outcomes is a general characteristic of those approaches, not specific to the
First Amendment. See MARK TUSHNET, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 73 (2014) (arguing that proportionality and rules-based approaches can
be extensionally equivalent).
19. I use the scare quotes here to indicate that the formulation does not entail a
commitment to a “categorical rules” structure. 
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II. STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPING A “LAW OF THE INTERNET UNTO
ITSELF ”
Here I identify two general strategies20 for following Justice
Jackson’s advice to think about a law of the Internet unto itself.
A. Allowing a Period of Policy Experimentation
In Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, Inc.
v. FCC, Justice John Paul Stevens wrote, “At this early stage in the
regulation of this developing industry, Congress should not be put
to an all-or-nothing choice.”21 The thought here is that individual
technological innovations implicate an array of dangers and consti-
tutional values, and that neither legislatures nor courts have any
special insights, relative to the other, about the constitutionally
appropriate response when the innovations have just been intro-
duced. This counsels in favor of deference to democratically respon-
sible decision making or, as Justice Stevens put it, deference to
congressional choices. But, as experience with the innovation and
with policy experiments accumulates, legislators and judges learn
more about specific dangers and how regulatory responses implicate
constitutional values. Our constitutional system assumes that at
some point judges’ comparative advantage in implementing consti-
tutional values in an informed way kicks in, and restrictive judicial
doctrine can develop.22
 The pattern of judicial deference to legislative choice followed
after some time by the development of judicial constraints on experi-
mentation is common.23 In the early years of motion pictures, the
20. I distinguish between interpretive methods such as balancing or rules, and strategies
for implementing either of those methods.
21. 518 U.S. 727, 769 (1996) (Stevens, J., concurring).
22. For a good overview of the historical development of First Amendment doctrine with
respect to several media technologies, see Robert Corn-Revere, The First Amendment and the
Electronic Media, FIRST AMENDMENT CTR. (Nov. 20, 2002), http://www.firstamendmentcenter.
org/internet-first-amendment-overview [http://perma.cc/QNU3-CPUF].
23. Cf. City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 759 (2010) (noting that in a case involving
pager technology and instant messages, “[t]he Court must proceed with care when considering
the whole concept of privacy expectations in communications made on electronic equipment
owned by a government employer. The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully on the
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Court held that movies were mere “spectacles” and, for that very
reason, movies were fully regulable without regard to the First
Amendment.24 Decades later, after society had become accustomed
to movies, the Court applied standard First Amendment doctrine to
their regulation.25 There were similar results with radio26 and cable
television.27 Writing in 1996—relatively late in the development of
cable television as a communications technology—Justice David
Souter observed, “All of the relevant characteristics of cable are
presently in a state of technological and regulatory flux.”28 For him,
that justified refraining from “announc[ing] a definitive categorical
analysis” to deal with the problem at hand.29 The Court is similarly
new to the technologies associated with the Internet.30
This strategy would direct one to a form of Internet exceptional-
ism, at least for some period. But, it is worth emphasizing that the
strategy need not lead to a state of permanent exceptionalism. As
experience accumulates, judges should be in a position to assimilate
regulations of now not-so-new technologies to the general body of
First Amendment doctrine, perhaps, as suggested earlier, with some
tweaks to deal with truly distinctive features of the technology.
Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology before its role in society has become
clear,” and referring to the Court’s “own knowledge and experience” in developing doctrine).
24. Mut. Film Co. v. Indus. Comm’n, 236 U.S. 230, 243-44 (1915).
25. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952).
26. Compare Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637-39 (1994) (discussing the
evolution of First Amendment doctrine dealing with broadcasting), with Nat’l Broad. Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 227 (1943) (“The right of free speech does not include, however,
the right to use the facilities of radio without a license.”). 
27. Compare Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 660-61 (applying intermediate First Amend-
ment scrutiny to some cable regulations), with FCC v. Midwest Video Co., 440 U.S. 689, 709
n.19 (1970) (finding it unnecessary to resolve the question of what First Amendment standard
was applicable to a regulation of cable television).
28. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 776 (1996)
(Souter, J., concurring). Professor Christopher S. Yoo refers to Denver Area as “experi-
ment[ing] with alternative rationales for subjecting cable operators to a lower level of First
Amendment scrutiny.” Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of the Internet as an
Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 750 (2010).
29. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 775 (Souter, J., concurring).
30. According to Judge M. Margaret McKeown, between 1996 and 2012, the Supreme
Court mentioned the Internet in seventeen cases, and “only seven were actually about the
Internet.” M. Margaret McKeown, The Internet and the Constitution: A Selective Retrospective,
9 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 135, 152 (2014).
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B. Drawing Inferences from the History of First Amendment
Treatment of Technological Innovations
In the same case about cable regulation in which Justice Souter
defended deference to regulatory experiments, Justice Anthony
Kennedy saw the problem differently: “When confronted with a
threat to free speech in the context of an emerging technology, we
ought to have the discipline to analyze the case by reference to exist-
ing elaborations of constant First Amendment principles.”31 That
“discipline” arises from the very experience that the first strategy
allows to accumulate.
The first strategy counsels deference to regulatory experimenta-
tion with each until experience accumulates about that particular
technology, at which point the courts can be confident about impos-
ing First Amendment constraints on further experimentation. The
first strategy, that is, hopes for wisdom to emerge from the accumu-
lation of experience within each technology. Proponents of the
second doctrine argue that we can also accumulate experience
across technologies. They observe the course of doctrinal develop-
ment about movies, radio, television, and cable, and note that there
is a thread running through each area: initial deference followed by
the application of standard First Amendment doctrine.32 Medium
exceptionalism is regularly replaced by general First Amendment
law. So, for example, movies were first outside the First Amend-
ment, then fully within it;33 the standard for regulating cable
television was first left undefined, then controversially became
subject to intermediate scrutiny, with strong voices arguing for the
application of the usual rules for content-based regulations.34 So, for
proponents of the second strategy, existing doctrine has resulted
from considering each technology separately, and yet a uniform doc-
trine has emerged. They infer, from experience, that we would profit
from short-circuiting the deference-to-standard-doctrine pathway
whenever legislatures attempt to regulate a new communication
31. Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 781 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the
judgment in part, and dissenting in part).
32. See supra Part II.A.
33. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
34. See supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
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medium. We are going to get to standard doctrine eventually, and,
they ask, why should society incur the interim costs of regulations
that, in retrospect, will seem unconstitutional?
I do not propose to offer any observations about which strategy
makes more sense. I note, though, that both strategies rely on ex-
perience; the first within technologies, the second across them. That
signals a more general issue in connection with drawing inferences
from experience, which is that we have to decide what is the domain
(or, as it is sometimes put, what is the “reference class”) of the
relevant experience. My sense is that the choice of domain is driven
by the analyst’s prior commitments: First Amendment “mavens”
will look across technologies, First Amendment skeptics—meaning,
those who are skeptical about aggressive judicial review of decisions
by democratically responsible legislatures—will look within technol-
ogies.35 If so, identifying the two strategies may help us understand
the structure of debates about Internet exceptionalism, but will not
help us come to a judgment about which side has the better case.
III. THE INTERNET’S DISTINCTIVE “NATURES, VALUES, [AND]
ABUSES”
What would Internet exceptionalism, either because of the
Internet’s distinctive characteristics, or standard doctrine with
tweaks to take account of those characteristics, look like? Justice
Jackson’s suggestion is that we should examine how the Internet
differs from traditional media with respect to its potential values
and abuses.36 But, the real question is somewhat different—not
what the differences are in some ontological sense, but rather this:
to what extent should courts in determining a regulation’s constitu-
tionality defer to a reasonable legislative judgment about those
35. In comments on a draft of this Article, Rebecca Tushnet suggested that First
Amendment skeptics may also look across technologies, sometimes finding reasons against
their skepticism in connection with the dissemination of some categories of material through
one technology, but thinking those reasons unavailing in connection with dissemination
through another. An example, though rejected by the Supreme Court, might be the thought
that regulation of obscene films might be justified even though regulation of words-only
obscenity would not be. For the Court’s rejection of that proposition, see Kaplan v. California,
413 U.S. 115, 118-19 (1973).
36. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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values and abuses? This is the real question because legislatures
enact regulations predicated on their judgments that each regula-
tion is a constitutionally appropriate response to what they under-
stand to be the Internet’s distinctive values and abuses.37 
Consider some possible regulation of cyberstalking.38 Physical
stalking is regulable because it induces fear in its victims and can
induce them to take costly protective measures (and because physi-
cal stalking is not, in general, an expressive activity covered by the
First Amendment or, at least, consists of action “brigaded with”
words, to invert Justice Douglas’s formulation).39 Cyberstalking
takes the form of words and images that induce fear.40 Existing
doctrine deals with words that induce fear under the doctrinal
heading of “threats,” and the First Amendment allows punishment
of such words only if they constitute a “true threat.”41 One issue that
arises in connection with true threats under standard doctrine is
whether an utterance is a true threat only when the threatener
subjectively intends to carry out the threat when the occasion for
doing so arises, or whether an utterance is a true threat when a
reasonable recipient would be put in fear.42 When a legislature
adopts a regulation of cyberstalking that goes beyond its general
37. In framing the issue in this way, I begin with the assumption that we should be
thinking in the first instance about regulations specifically targeted at the dissemination of
information over the Internet, and not about the application of general regulations of speech
to the Internet as well as other media. The issue of deference to legislative judgments arises
most clearly in connection with such targeted regulations. I note, though, that the issue of
deference to legislative judgment arises in only a slightly different form with respect to
general regulations properly interpreted to apply to the Internet.
38. In the discussion that follows I do not discuss any specific regulation, and in particular
I do not discuss whether some such regulation might be unconstitutionally vague or unconsti-
tutionally overbroad. I note, though, that the standard for determining acceptable unclarity
or breadth might depend on a prior judgment about whether Internet exceptionalism (or a
tweak to standard doctrine) is appropriate. My sense is that many invocations of vagueness
or overbreadth doctrine in the context of Internet regulation rely without analysis on the prop-
osition that what is vague or overbroad with respect to traditional media is necessarily vague
or overbroad with respect to Internet regulation. However, that is precisely what is at issue.
39. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring).
40. Nisha Ajmani, Comment, Cyberstalking and Free Speech: Rethinking the Rangel
Standard in the Age of the Internet, 90 OR. L. REV. 303, 304 (2011).
41. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707-08 (1969).
42. The issue is pending before the Supreme Court in Elonis v. United States, No. 13-983
(U.S. argued Dec. 1, 2014), a case involving cyberstalking but prosecuted under a general
threat statute. See supra note 37 (discussing the distinction between Internet-targeted and
general regulations).
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regulation of threats, it implicitly (or perhaps even explicitly)
determines that the dissemination of threatening words to victims
over the Internet is distinctively harmful—perhaps, for example,
because it is easier to ensure that threatening words reach the
victim via the Internet than via traditional media. It seems (to
me—and so, I think, could reasonably seem to legislators) more
likely that a victim will become aware of a threatening Facebook
posting than of a classified advertisement. And, the cost of posting
on Facebook is lower than the cost of mailing a threatening letter to
the victim. In enacting the cyberstalking statute, the legislature has
made a judgment about the relative ease of communicating a threat
via the Internet. Assume that that judgment is a reasonable one.
Should a judge say, though, that the greater ease is not “large
enough” to justify distinctive regulation? The answer to that ques-
tion depends in large part on one’s account of the deference judges
should give to legislative judgments.43
With the issue of judicial deference in hand, I turn to several of
the characteristics typically invoked in discussions of whether there
should be Internet exceptionalism. I depart from what I think is the
usual order of presentation, in which scope, cost, and anonymity are
said to distinguish the Internet from other media, and begin with
norms.
A. Internet Norms Are Fluid or Nonexistent 
The fact that in practice anyone can use the Internet as a plat-
form for distributing ideas and information means that it is nearly
impossible to generate widely adhered-to norms of appropriate
behavior.44 The well-known cartoon with the caption, “On the Inter-
net, nobody knows you’re a dog” is a comment not only about the
anonymity the Internet affords, but on the fact that nothing—name,
reputation, or any other norm—vouches for what appears on the
Internet.45 The existence of “comment trolls,” and even the existence
43. My experience, for what it is worth, is that men tend to think that the greater ease
of disseminating threats is not large enough, whereas (some) women think that it is.
44. I qualify this observation later, in my discussion of the question of intermediaries’
First Amendment rights.
45. The implication is captured in the subtitle of a play by Alan David Perkins: “Nobody
Knows I’m a Dog: Six People; Six Lies; One Internet.” Alan David Perkins, Nobody Knows I’m
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of a term for the phenomenon, shows that there are as yet no real
constraining norms of Internet behavior, as does Godwin’s Law.46
Norms may arise within discrete communities, and some of those
communities might be quite large. Yet, it is in the Internet’s
“nature,” to use Justice Jackson’s term, that material circulated
within a community and conforming to its norms will leak into other
communities with other, perhaps more restrictive norms.47 So, for
example, one can readily imagine a subcommunity on the Internet
whose members regularly use, and are not offended by, extremely
crude and sexually explicit language. Members of other subcom-
munities who come upon that language might be offended—or, in
some cases, psychologically and even materially injured—by it.
More consequential is the question of treating bloggers as mem-
bers of the news media. That question arises in connection with
statutes creating reporters’ privileges to conceal their sources from
inquiry or to get access to locations closed to members of the general
public.48 Professor Sonja West, defending special rules for “the
press,” offers a definition that is in part implicitly norm based. For
her, one component of the definition involves “[t]raining, [e]duca-
tion, or [e]xperience” in the field.49 Although she does not develop
the justification in detail, it appears that training and experience
matter because they are methods by which a person becomes accul-
turated to the field’s norms.50
a Dog (1995), http://www.alandavidperkins.com/nkiad/ [http://perma.cc/3KV6-SXA8]; see also
Michael Cavna, “Nobody Knows You’re a Dog”: As Iconic Internet Cartoon Turns 20, Creator




BRBB] (discussing the continuing relevance of the cartoon).
46. Godwin’s Law asserts, “As an online discussion grows longer, the probability of a
comparison involving Nazis or Hitler approaches one.” Mike Godwin, Meme, Counter-meme,
WIRED, (Oct. 1994), http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/2.10/godwin.if.html
[http://perma.cc/F6R9-U7YW]. 
47. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 97-98 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
48. For a recent discussion, see Sonja R. West, Press Exceptionalism, 127 HARV. L. REV.
2434 (2014).
49. Id. at 2459.
50. Cf. id. at 2460 (referring to “independent journalistic activity”in connection with these
elements).
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Norms or their absence may matter for the issue of Internet
exceptionalism because standard First Amendment doctrine may
rest on a judgment that norms—of newspapers, broadcasters, and
the like—have developed to restrict harmful actions to some signifi-
cant degree. The New Zealand Court of Appeal noted the importance
of norms for developing the rules to be applied in cases involving
false statements about public figures: “New Zealand has not en-
countered the worst excesses and irresponsibilities of the English
national daily tabloids.”51 Because the New Zealand press was
“responsible,” imposing liability relatively unrestrictedly would not
have had significant effects on how the New Zealand press dissem-
inate information.52 When norms operate to limit the damage done
across a wide range of information distribution, only normative
outliers will engage in harmful dissemination of information and
ideas. And perhaps standard First Amendment doctrine assumes
that these normative outliers will be few, in part because markets
will constrain behavior because relatively few consumers would
purchase what the outliers were selling, with the result that the
harm they cause will be small. Finally, with few normative outliers,
attempting to control their behavior by law (norms having failed)
might have undesirable effects on those who generally adhere to
appropriate norms.53 
Internet exceptionalists might suggest that a world without
norms is different from the world in which standard First Amend-
ment doctrine developed. By definition, there are no outliers, ready
access to the Internet means that large numbers of “unsocialized”
speakers will in fact distribute ideas and information, and the size
of the market coupled with relatively low costs of dissemination
means that (to overstate a bit) anyone can make a living by dissem-
inating anything. The resulting harm might54 be large enough to
51. Lange v Atkinson [2000] 3 NZLR 385 (CA).
52. Although the court was developing the common law in a system without judicially
enforceable constitutional protection of free expression, the court clearly understood that the
common law should be developed in ways responsive to the values of free expression.
53. This is what motivates concern for the “chilling effect” of regulations: even those who
comply with the regulations may fear that they will have to defend their actions at some cost
and risk being held liable as a result of what are analytically mistaken applications of the
regulations.
54. The word “might” here flags once again the question of judicial deference to legislative
judgments.
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justify regulations of the normless Internet world that would be
impermissible for the norm-pervaded world of traditional media.
Perhaps the Internet is now normless. But, things could change
and norms could develop to regulate substantial amounts of the
information distribution on the Internet informally, without legal
intervention.55 An Internet exceptionalist might rely on that obser-
vation to support the pursuit of the first regulatory strategy,
allowing experimentation with regulation until experience accumu-
lates about whether or the extent to which acceptable norms come
to characterize behavior on the Internet.56 One might wonder,
though, about the possibility that norms could develop so that
judges could eventually enforce constraints on legislative experi-
mentation pursuant to the first strategy. The issues of scope and
cost, discussed next, may be both part of the Internet’s nature and
important causes of normlessness on the Internet. If so, norms will
never develop. An Internet exceptionalist might conclude that courts
should never attempt to constrain legislative experimentation with
Internet regulation, although that conclusion is in some tension
with the rhetoric typically associated with the first strategy. And,
once again in contrast, the proponent of applying standard First
Amendment doctrine to the Internet might give permanent norm-
lessness as the very reason for following the second strategy.
B. The Internet Is a Bigger and Better System for Amplifying
“Sound”
Consider the classic First Amendment case Debs v. United
States.57 Eugene V. Debs, a powerful orator, made an antiwar
speech and was prosecuted for interfering with the war effort.58 The
55. Section 230 loosens legal regulation in part to encourage the development of norms
by protecting intermediaries against state tort law liability for “any action voluntarily taken
in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers
to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objection-
able, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A)
(2012).
56. Cf. The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) (“[I]n most cases reasonable
prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole calling may
have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices.” (emphasis added)).
57. 249 U.S. 211 (1919).
58. Id. at 212-14.
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Court upheld his conviction,59 but under a doctrine it has since
repudiated.60 One reason—not the only one, I emphasize—is that
the risk was relatively low that Debs’s speech would actually lead
to interference with the war effort. His audience was a small frac-
tion of the national population, so even if he persuaded some listen-
ers to act on what he said, not much damage to the war effort would
occur. Give Debs a bigger bullhorn—that is, a means of disseminat-
ing his message much more widely—and the risk of actual harm
increases.61 As the Court put it in Reno v. ACLU, “Through the use
of chat rooms, any person with a phone line can become a town crier
with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any soap-
box.”62
United States v. White presents a variant on the “bigger bullhorn”
argument.63 The defendant operated a white supremacist website,
with many postings praising assassinations and other violent acts,
and often identifying people who, White said, deserved to be killed.64
He posted detailed information on his website, including the name,
address, and phone numbers of the foreperson of a jury that convic-
ted another white supremacist of soliciting harm to a federal judge
(the judge’s husband and mother had been murdered, though not
by the defendant in the case over which she presided).65 White was
charged with soliciting a violent crime against the juror.66 The court
of appeals held that White did not have a valid First Amendment
defense:
59. Id. at 216-17.
60. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449-50 (1969) (Black, J., concurring) (“[T]he ‘clear
and present danger’ doctrine should have no place in the interpretation of the First
Amendment.”).
61. Cf. Seth F. Kreimer, Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet
Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 11, 13 (2006)
(referring to “the exponential increase in the number of speakers with potential access to
broad audiences”).
62. 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997) (emphasis added); see also United States v. Am. Library
Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 207 (2003) (“As Congress recognized, ‘[t]he Internet is simply another
method for making information available in a school of library.’ It is ‘no more than a
technological extension of the book stack.’” (citations omitted)).
63. 698 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2012).
64. Id. at 1009.
65. Id. at 1009-10.
66. Id. at 1010.
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Though the government did not present a specific “solicitee,” it
was unnecessary to do so given the very nature of the solicita-
tion—an electronic broadcast which, a reasonable jury could
conclude, was specifically designed to reach as many white
supremacist readers as possible so that someone could kill or
harm Juror A.67
There are of course distinctions between Debs and White.68 Yet,
both involved a risk that someone would commit a crime as a result
of listening to (or viewing) some words and images. The court of ap-
peals’s reference to “as many white supremacist readers as possible”
suggests that imposing liability on White was constitutionally per-
missible because he had a particularly susceptible readership large
enough to make the risk that violence would occur significant
enough to support regulation.69
Internet exceptionalism would allow legislatures to make the
judgment that the substantially larger audience available for com-
munications over the Internet increases otherwise acceptable levels
of risk beyond a tolerable threshold. Proponents of applying stan-
dard First Amendment doctrine would disagree. They might argue,
for example, that the concern in standard First Amendment
doctrine is not with the size of risk, but the mechanisms by which
risk is realized. Brandenburg v. Ohio holds that a person can be con-
victed of uttering words that increase the risk of violence only
if—among several other criteria—the words are words of “incite-
ment.”70 The theory is that such words bypass the listener’s
deliberative capacities, effectively turning the listener into a weapon
in the speaker’s hands rather than an autonomous decision maker.
The broader First Amendment theory on which Brandenburg rests,
according to one prominent account, is that the First Amendment
bars liability for harm that results when a speaker persuades
someone else to take unlawful action.71
67. Id. at 1016.
68. Primarily, that the crime in Debs was not a specific intent crime, whereas the crime
in White was. See id. at 1012 (quoting the jury instruction requiring that the government
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt “with strongly corroborative circumstances, that the
defendant intended for another person to commit a violent federal crime”).
69. See id. at 1010.
70. 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
71. See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91
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In addition, one might note that just as the risk of resulting harm
increases, perhaps dramatically, as the size of the audience increas-
es when material is distributed over the Internet, so does the harm
caused by suppressing the distribution of that material. Shutting
down White’s website, for example, prevents the rest of us from
learning about the positions being taken by real white supremacists.
Which is the more important risk? Here too the general issue of
deference to legislative judgments arises. Saying that judges should
apply standard First Amendment doctrine implies that judges
rather than legislatures should decide what the balance of risks
should be.
C. Disseminating Information over the Internet Is Dramatically
Less Costly than Other Modes of Dissemination 
WikiLeaks and data-mining are standard examples of the fact
that a combination of non-Internet technology and the Internet has
made it substantially easier to assemble information and dissemi-
nate it.72 As Neil Richards puts it, “a number of recent technological
advances and cultural shifts have enabled the easier dissemination
of [personal] information and the creation of larger, more detailed,
and more useful data-bases.”73 For any level of cost, the Internet
user can compile and distribute a much larger amount of informa-
tion than he or she could through other technologies.74 As Jack
Balkin observes, “social media lower the costs of informing and
organizing people quickly.”75
COLUM. L. REV. 334, 337-39 (1991).
72. The computers used to compile information for data mining and the thumb drives
used to download information from the Web are not necessarily linked to Internet
technology—someone with two computers, neither of which are linked to the Internet, could
use a thumb drive to transfer information from one to the other computer—but obviously the
existence of the Internet makes those technologies much more useful.
73. Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52 UCLA L.
REV. 1149, 1150 (2005).
74. As an analytic matter, scope and cost are closely related (perhaps even the same), but
distinguishing between them seems to me useful for expository purposes.
75. Jack M. Balkin, The First Amendment Is an Information Policy, 41 HOFSTRA L. REV.
1, 11 (2012). Balkin uses the observation to identify some of the benefits of lower costs. For
a judicial observation referring to possible drawbacks of lower costs, see Blumenthal v.
Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 49 (D.D.C. 1998) (blending cost and scope concerns, the Court refer-
red to “[t]he near instantaneous possibilities for the dissemination of information by millions
of different information providers around the world to those with access to computers”).
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The cost of inflicting harm always constrains doing so: In a world
in which libelous statements can be distributed only through a
newspaper, there will be fewer such statements than in a world
where they can be distributed via the Internet, simply because it is
cheaper to log on to the Internet than to purchase a newspaper with
its editorial offices and publishing plant. The same goes for all forms
of regulable harms—invasions of privacy, copyright infringement,76
or damage to national security. 
Lower cost means that constraints on inflicting harms (to
national security or by invasion of privacy, for example) are weaker
than they are in connection with traditional media. Standard consti-
tutional doctrine deals with liability for distributing information
that is both truthful and harmful in two branches. First, the First
Amendment protects the distributor against liability if the informa-
tion is produced without violating the law and the distributor
acquires it without breaking the law. For example, in Florida Star
v. B.J.F., the Court held unconstitutional a statute prohibiting the
publication, in a medium of “mass communication,” the name of a
victim of a sexual offense, in a case in which a reporter found the
victim’s name on a police report, which was available to anyone who
walked in at the police department’s press room.77 The second
branch of the doctrine deals with information that is “produced”
illegally—as the Court put it, “[w]here the ... publisher of informa-
tion has obtained the information ... in a manner lawful in itself but
from a source who has obtained it unlawfully.”78 In such cases, the
Court balances the harm done by the disclosure against the public
interest in providing access to the information.79
76. For an example of this reasoning in practice, see Universal Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d
429, 453 (2d Cir. 2001) (upholding the constitutionality of an injunction issued under the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act prohibiting the publication of a decryption code, and
observing that “[t]he advent of the Internet creates the potential for instantaneous worldwide
distribution of the [decrypted and] copied material”). 
77. 491 U.S. 524, 527-28 (1989).
78. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 528 (2001) (quoting Boehner v. McDermott, 191
F.3d 463, 484-85 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (Sentelle, J., dissenting)).
79. Id. at 534 (“In these cases, privacy concerns give way when balanced against the
interest in publishing matters of public importance.”). I assume for present purposes that the
same approach would be taken with respect to harms to national security, though the balance
might be struck differently.
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Standard doctrine involves the traditional media—in the cases
discussed above,80 a newspaper and a radio station—and perhaps it
implicitly rests on an evaluation of the harms of suppression given
likelihood of harm to other interests in light of the cost constraints
associated with those media. What are those costs? First, there is
the cost to the originator of acquiring the information. In Bartnicki
v. Vopper, the information was gleaned from overhearing a cell
phone conversation on a device that intercepted the conversation.81
The cost is that of obtaining and using the interception technology,
a cost that I will characterize as moderate rather than low. Some-
times, the cost to the originator will be low—for example, download-
ing information to a thumb drive in the Bradley Manning Wiki-
Leaks case.82
Second, there is the cost to the distributor of obtaining any
specific piece of information. In Florida Star, that cost was having
a reporter who had the time to go to the police station’s press room
to look at the police reports there,83 again what I will characterize
as a moderate cost. In Bartnicki, in contrast, this cost was quite low,
as the originator basically dropped the tape recording into the radio
station’s lap.84 For the Internet, I suspect that this second cost is
almost always going to be low.
Third, though, there is the cost of maintaining an organization
that is in a position to get and use the information. There has to be
a newspaper or radio station for the problems in Florida Star or
Bartnicki to arise. Similarly, there has to be an organization like
WikiLeaks to acquire information from Manning. I will assume that
the cost of maintaining these organizations, whether traditional or
Internet, is relatively large. But, it probably is worth noting that the
costs of maintaining traditional media organizations include rather
large costs of a relatively immobile physical plant, such as printing
machines, whereas the costs of a physical plant for businesses that
distribute information and ideas over the Internet are relatively
80. See supra notes 77-79 and accompanying text.
81. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 518.
82. See Marc Ambinder, WikiLeaks: One Analyst, So Many Documents, NAT’L J. (Nov. 29,
2010), http://www.nationaljournal.com/whitehouse/wikileaks-one-analyst-so-many-documents-
20101129 [http://perma.cc/ZFB-882T].
83. Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 527-28 (1989).
84. See Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 519.
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low—computers that can be rather easily transported and office
space that can be rented.
We also need to focus on what precisely the organization is—that
is, on its business model. The business models in Florida Star and
Bartnicki were ones in which the information distributor engaged
in some screening of, or editorial judgment about, what it would
disseminate. Internet distributors might have a similar model, in
which case the cost of maintaining the Internet organization would
be comparable to that of maintaining traditional media. An Internet
distributor might have a different business model, though, as Wiki-
Leaks reportedly does. The Internet distributor could simply take
what it receives and send it out, leaving it to others to evaluate its
content. Relative to traditional media, this is a low-cost business
model (the cost of maintaining the organization aside).85 Other
business models, of course, might depend on the use of additional
screening mechanisms, the use of which might increase the cost to
a moderate level.
I have provided this sketch of various costs because standard
doctrine might have been developed with an implicit understanding
of the costs associated with acquiring and disseminating informa-
tion. Perhaps the Court assumed that overall, the costs were rea-
sonably high. The Court might have implicitly considered that those
costs would in themselves limit the amount of harmful information
distributed by the traditional media. Then, the Court might have
asked, “In light of what we think is the likely amount of harmful
information these media can distribute consistent with their
business models, what may legislatures add by law consistent with
the First Amendment?” Were the costs lower, the amount of harmful
information distributed would be different, and the Court’s interpre-
tation of the First Amendment might be different as well. The
obvious pressure point is the balancing test in the second branch of
standard doctrine, but even with respect to the first branch, the
Court might come to think that a categorical rule was undesirable.
85. According to Julian Assange, WikiLeaks’s founder, in 2010 the organization had five
full time employees and relied on about 800 volunteers. Stefan May, Leak-o-nomy: The Econo-
my of WikiLeaks (Interview with Julian Assange), MEDIEN-ÖKONOMIE-BLOG (Jan. 4, 2010),
http://stefanmey.wordpress.com/2010/01/04/leak-o-nomy-the-economy-of-wikileaks
[http://perma.cc/K3M4-XNPX]. The Florida Star’s website identifies a staff numbering twenty-
eight. The Florida Star Staff, THE FLORIDA STAR (Aug. 11, 2014), http://www.thefloridastar.
com/about-2 [http://perma.cc/Y74A-2SMS]. 
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Internet exceptionalism—or standard doctrine tweaked to deal with
lower costs—might then develop.
D. The Putative Anonymity of the Internet
Finally, I return to the “nobody knows you’re a dog” meme. Hold-
ing the cost of acting constant, perhaps it is easier to operate anony-
mously on the Internet. For example, it might be more difficult to
determine who is cyberstalking you than to determine who is
physically doing so: the technology of detecting physical stalking can
be relatively simple—just keep your eyes open86—whereas the
technology of identifying a cyberstalker may require sophisticated
techniques of tracking IP addresses, penetrating security walls, and
the like.87 
The additional cost may sometimes matter. Consider threat
liability again. Standard First Amendment doctrine allows the gov-
ernment to impose liability for making true threats.88 The case law
involves liability imposed through the criminal law,89 but a legisla-
ture could unquestionably create a civil cause of action by a victim
against a person who sent her a true threat. If the cyberstalking
cause of action imposes liability only on the cyberstalker himself,
the anonymity afforded by the Internet is irrelevant: the victim can
recover only if she identifies the cyberstalker. Or, put another way,
a cyberstalker who remains anonymous is free from liability under
such a cause of action.
As the White case shows, the government may have the resources
to track down a person who threatens via the Internet.90 Ordinary
civil litigants, though, might not be able readily to identify their cy-
berstalkers. A legislature creating a civil cause of action for cyber-
stalking might take that fact into account in structuring liability.
The obvious way to do so is to make Internet intermediaries liable
86. Of course there are more complex technologies, such as installing surveillance
cameras, and some more expensive ones, such as hiring a private detective.
87. See Jack M. Balkin, The Future of Free Expression in a Digital Age, 36 PEPP. L. REV.
427, 434 (2009) (“Much speech on the Internet is anonymous, it may be difficult to find the
person who is speaking.”).
88. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969).
89. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
90. United States v. White, 698 F.3d 1005 (7th Cir. 2012). Though in White the defendant
made no real efforts to conceal his identity on the Internet. See id. at 1011.
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for distributing true threats (or other material that can be regulated
under standard First Amendment law). Alternatively, it can impose
liability for refusing to turn over information that would enable the
victim to determine who was issuing the threat—a refusal, I em-
phasize again, that would flow from the business model the inter-
mediaries adopted.91 Would that be permissible under the First
Amendment?
Here I sketch a map of the possibilities. The starting point, per-
haps oddly, is New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, which held that an
intermediary can be held liable for publishing a false statement
made by another person, if the intermediary transmitted the state-
ment with knowledge of the statement’s falsity or with reckless
disregard for its truth or falsity.92 There, a group of supporters of
the civil rights movement drafted an advertisement and paid the
newspaper to publish it.93 The newspaper was simply an intermedi-
ary for the transmission of the advertisement’s message. But, had
standard First Amendment requirements of knowledge or reckless
disregard been satisfied, the newspaper could have been held liable
for publishing libelous statements.94 Sullivan showed that an
intermediary does not automatically have First Amendment pro-
tection for statements it transmits.95 What matters is whether
substantive First Amendment requirements are satisfied.
Satisfying such requirements is similarly necessary for establish-
ing liability for threats.96 Suppose that the substantive requirement
for threat liability is that a reasonable person would take the
utterance to be a true threat. With respect to that objective stan-
dard, and subject to a qualification I introduce in a moment, the
threatener and any intermediary who transmits the threat are in
the same position, each putting the victim in fear.97 It might seem
91. Congress has immunized intermediaries from liability under the Communications
Decency Act. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). The question I consider in the text is whether, in the ab-
sence of statutory provision, intermediaries have a First Amendment immunity from liability.
92. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
93. Id. at 256-57.
94. Contra id. at 279-80.
95. See id.
96. See Virginia v. Black, 558 U.S. 343 (2003).
97. Importantly, the threatener and the intermediary are equally subject to “chilling
effect” concerns. See supra note 53. The substantive standard is designed with those concerns
in mind. But cf. Kreimer, supra note 61, at 27-28 (arguing that the risk of error is larger for
intermediaries than for originators, in part because “intermediaries have a peculiarly fragile
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that the outcome should be different if the substantive standard
requires a subjective intent to threaten. The threatener might have
the requisite intent, but the intermediary would not. So, it might
seem, intermediaries might have some First Amendment protec-
tions that cyberstalkers and the like might not, depending on the
substantive First Amendment rules.
The analysis becomes slightly more complex when intermediaries
object that as a practical matter they cannot check every message
they transmit to determine (in the case of libel) whether it was false
or (in the case of true threats) whether the message would put a
reasonable recipient in fear. With respect to libel, the objection
might prevail if the intermediary made some, possibly cursory, ef-
fort to check truth.98 With respect to true threats under the objective
standard, intermediaries can use algorithms to identify potentially
threatening messages and then can inspect those messages to see
if they are objectively true threats.99 
Internet intermediaries have argued that the First Amendment
ought to bar the government from requiring that they use some
method for inspecting the messages they transmit, on the ground
that inspection would be too expensive and that users rely on
assurances that whatever they originate will reach its destination.100
That argument must be unpacked. What it asserts is that the inter-
mediaries have adopted business models that are profitable only if
victims of unprotected speech101 bear costs that could in principle be
shifted to the intermediaries. It is not clear that the First Amend-
ment should be taken as a restriction on the government’s ability to
commitment to the speech that they facilitate”). Kreimer continues, “revenue from the mar-
ginal customer brings only a small payoff, a benefit that can easily be dwarfed by threatened
penalties.” Id. at 28. One response is the availability of insurance, the cost of which is taken
into account in designing a business model. See infra note 103 and accompanying text.
98. For example, perhaps a statement in the intermediary’s terms of service that those
who originate statements warrant their truth would be sufficient to show that the
intermediary did not act with reckless disregard for truth.
99. For example, an algorithm could pull from the stream all messages with the words “I’d
like to kill” (and more, of course). Some statements that are objectively true threats might not
be caught by the algorithm, but one can imagine a First Amendment standard that would
protect intermediaries who used reasonable algorithms to identify threatening messages.
100. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 754, 830 (1996).
101. These include people whose reputation is damaged by the dissemination of false
statements about them or people who are put in fear and perhaps take costly protective
measures after receiving true threats.
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regulate business models.102 That observation also suggests that
threat liability might be imposed on intermediaries without viola-
ting the First Amendment even if the substantive standard for true
threats is subjective. The reason is that intermediaries can, at least
in principle, obtain insurance against liability. On this view, the
First Amendment does not guarantee that intermediaries can
choose whatever business model they want, without regard to the
harms produced by using one rather than another model.103
Introducing the idea of business models helps us understand
another argument against intermediary liability. The person who
makes a true threat gets something—a sense of satisfaction, per-
haps—out of making the threat; the intermediary who transmits it
does not. No matter what the content, a rule imposing liability on
the intermediary will induce the intermediary to suppress more
speech than would the same rule applied to originators. This is
because the intermediary, or so the argument goes, does not lose
anything from “overcensoring” speech—that is, refusing to transmit
speech in circumstances in which the originator is in fact protected
by the First Amendment.104 But, the argument fails to take into
account the fact that the intermediaries do gain something from
transmitting the message. It would not be the psychological satisfac-
tion that the originator gets, of course, but the financial returns
from adopting a business model in which they transmit whatever is
presented to them. Intermediaries, that is, do lose something by
overcensoring speech.105
102. Cf. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1945) (rejecting the
proposition that the First Amendment provided the Associated Press with a defense to an
antitrust action). For a somewhat more extended discussion, see infra Part IV.B.
103. I think the fact that, in principle, insurance is available for all forms of liability for
disseminating harmful speech argues rather strongly against the proposition that the First
Amendment restricts intermediary liability, at least if the First Amendment does not
constrain government regulation of choice among business models. For a discussion of that
proposition, see infra Part IV.B.
104. For presentations of versions of this argument, see Kreimer, supra note 61, at 95-100,
and Felix T. Wu, Collateral Censorship and the Limits of Intermediary Immunity, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 293 (2011).
105. Kreimer argues that intermediaries’ financial losses are unlikely to be large enough
to eliminate (or perhaps even reduce substantially) overcensorship, in part because users are
unlikely to read or understand disclosures contained in terms of service. Kreimer, supra note
61, at 33-40. In addition, market structure might matter: intermediaries who have something
close to a monopoly need not fear loss of business. But monopoly-like power is a traditional
basis that justifies regulation, even in the context of the distribution of ideas and information.
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The argument so far is that intermediary liability, when properly
constructed, is compatible with standard First Amendment doctrine
with some tweaks. Subject only to those tweaks, originators of state-
ments and those who transmit them can equally be held liable
under the applicable substantive First Amendment standards.106
And, I doubt that Internet exceptionalism for intermediary liability
would be defensible because of the anonymity associated with the
Internet.107 Internet exceptionalism here would mean this: the First
Amendment would protect a statement’s originator but not the
intermediary who transmitted it. I find such a rule difficult to
understand or justify.
IV. SOME ADDITIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
The preceding examination of the doctrinal terrain mapped out
by claims for and against Internet exceptionalism has revealed that
both the competing theses—exceptionalism and standard doctrine
with tweaks—are defensible only when the claims are qualified in
connection with specific sub-doctrines. This Part deals with some
qualifications that are somewhat more pervasive: a question about
the structure of constitutional doctrine, a question about the First
Amendment’s applicability to business models, and a question about
state action that lurks in the discussion of intermediary liability.
A. Doctrinal Structure
Part I argued that the idea of Internet exceptionalism makes
sense only with a categorical doctrinal structure because a balanc-
That bandwidth was limited, for example, was the rationale for finding regulation of
broadcasting constitutionally permissible. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969) (referring to “the scarcity of radio frequencies”).
106. At this point, I think it appropriate to note once again that I am here considering
whether judges would be justified in using the First Amendment to constrain legislative
choices to impose liability, not whether such choices would be good ones. For example, in some
settings, good policy might impose a regime of notice-and-takedown, though I doubt that such
a policy would be adequate in the case of true threats.
107. I insert the “because of anonymity” qualification because the argument about the
broader scope of transmissions over the Internet, discussed above in Part II.B., might support
intermediary liability when the originator might be protected by the First Amendment—for
example, in cases where the originator did not intentionally use the Internet to broaden the
audience for his or her message.
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ing structure can take account of everything that is said to make the
Internet distinctive. There is, however, one complication: the possi-
bility of categorical balancing. Categorical balancing has this struc-
ture: one identifies some relevant domain of speech—commercial
speech, sexually explicit material, political speech—and initially
conducts a balancing inquiry over all cases within that category.108
One then examines the outcomes of that balancing and comes up
with a categorical rule applicable to all cases within the domain, or
with a set of rules and subrules that covers the domain.
As I observed in an analogous context in Part II, the critical step
in categorical balancing is identifying the domain within which one
is to do the balancing. Scholarship on Internet exceptionalism or
new technologies of speech more generally offers two candidates for
the relevant domain. For the moment, I will call the first one a tra-
ditional domain definition. We identify the domains by the charac-
teristics of the regulations. We ask: Does the regulation deal with
a specific subject matter for regulation, such as political speech,
commercial speech, and the like? Then, within each subject-matter
domain, does the regulation deal with the content of the speech, or
the viewpoint it expresses? Alternatively, is the regulation neutral
as to the speech’s content or viewpoint? 
I call this the “traditional” domain definition because we already
know the outcome of the balancing within each category. It is what
I have called standard First Amendment doctrine, with its require-
ments, with respect to some domains, of narrow tailoring, compel-
ling governmental interest, and the like.
The second candidate for domain-definition is, as Justice Jackson
might be taken to have suggested, based on the medium.109 We ex-
amine proposed regulations dealing with the press, with broadcast-
ing, and now the Internet, do the required balancing and come up
with appropriate rules. Perhaps those rules will map quite precisely
onto standard First Amendment doctrine, but there is no reason a
priori to think that they will—that is, no reason to think from the
outset that medium-based rules will use criteria like content-neu-
108. “Initially” here can refer to a temporal sequence, as in the first, “experimentation”
strategy for dealing with innovative speech technologies, or a purely analytic process in which
one does the balancing in one’s head.
109. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 98 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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trality and the like.110 Perhaps, for example, the distinction between
content-based and content-neutral rules makes sense regarding
dissemination of information and ideas through print, but makes
less sense with respect to such dissemination via broadcasting or
the Internet. One cannot know without going through the process
of categorical balancing.
As I suggested in Part II, there is generally no policy-independent
way of choosing the domains within which we conduct categorical
balancing. It remains true that there is no need for Internet
exceptionalism in a regime of pure balancing, but it might emerge
from the process of categorical balancing.111 
B. Business Models and the First Amendment
Professor Rebecca Tushnet has observed that in Sullivan, the
Supreme Court invoked the First Amendment to limit an intermedi-
ary’s liability for actions taken consistent with its business model.
As she pointed out, “What the actual malice standard protected was
... [the newspaper’s] business model—accepting the speech of others
with only limited fact-checking.”112 One might interpret the decision
as constructing First Amendment doctrine with an eye to the news-
paper’s business model: given the fact that their business model is
one in which they can do only limited fact checking,113 what should
First Amendment doctrine be? An alternative, and I think better,
reading is that the existence of limited fact checking showed that
New York Times Co. did not act with reckless disregard for the
truth. On that reading, Sullivan does not stand in the way of
business-model regulations adopted for reasons other than the
110. Chen concludes that differences among media are not large enough for us to expect
that categorical balancing done with media as the relevant domains will yield rules
differentiated by medium. Chen, supra note 14. I take no position on that question.
111. To the extent that categorical balancing is a process that extends over time, it might
well be the way in which we pursue the first “experimentalist” strategy for dealing with
innovative speech technologies, but I do not think that there is an analytic connection
between categorical balancing and the experimentalist strategy.
112. Rebecca Tushnet, Power Without Responsibility: Intermediaries and the First
Amendment, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 986, 1005 (2008).
113. Here “can do” means that the cost of more extensive fact checking would make the
business unprofitable in its current form.
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suppression of the dissemination of information, either generally or
through specific business models.
As is widely understood, the adoption of one section of the Com-
munications Decency Act—now 47 U.S.C. § 230—makes it un-
necessary to consider (today) whether a legislature could impose
intermediary liability for distributing harmful material originated
by others.114 Suppose, though, that § 230 were replaced by a regime
requiring that intermediaries do something to limit the distribution
of harmful material—that they adopt a different business model.
The question is whether such business-model regulation would be
constitutionally permissible, even though the regime might be
described as one in which the regulation was adopted for the
purpose of restricting the dissemination of harmful information. 
In initially discussing intermediary liability, I assumed that the
First Amendment placed few constraints on a legislature’s power to
prescribe or ban business models, even if the business is the dis-
semination of information and ideas. Clearly, however, the First
Amendment must place some constraints on that power. For
example, it would be unconstitutional for a legislature to require
that newspapers be “printed” by scribes using quill pens. It is less
obvious that a legislature could not require that newspapers be
printed on newsprint manufactured in the United States.115 And
that would be true even in the face of a newspaper’s claim that its
business model requires that it use non-U.S. manufactured paper—
even if, that is, complying with the requirement would drive the
newspaper out of business.116
114. See Tushnet, supra note 112, at 1008 n.95 (“Before the CDA, the assumption in the
law reviews tended to be that the Sullivan standard was the best to be hoped for as a
constitutional matter.”). Rebecca Tushnet also observes that it was “not much argued” that
there was “a constitutional right to operate a search engine free of liability for the indexed
content.” Id. at 1008. 
115. At the state level, preemption questions aside.
116. But cf. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (holding unconstitutional a
state statute that imposed a sales tax on newspapers with large circulations). I believe that
Grosjean is best understood as holding that a statute, general on its face, that is adopted for
the purpose of suppressing an information-providing business (or, even more narrowly, that
is targeted at such business because of the content of what they distribute) is
unconstitutional: a legislature cannot escape the limits the First Amendment places on
content-based or viewpoint-based regulation by “gerrymandering” a statute so that it affects
only the disfavored content or viewpoint.
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What is the difference between the two requirements?117 Probably
that the only imaginable reason for adopting the first statute is to
limit the distribution of information by newspapers, whereas the
second statute has or could have other purposes. Now consider a
regulation whose purpose is to require that a business internalize
the harms it inflicts on others. One example is ordinary tort liability
for damages caused by negligent operation of the trucks used to
distribute the business’s products. I think it clear that a newspaper
could not claim First Amendment protection against that regulation
when its delivery trucks cause harmful accidents, and that would be
true even if the newspaper claimed that its business model required
that its trucks regularly operate at dangerous speeds.118 Intermedi-
ary liability of the sort I have discussed has the same analytic
structure: it imposes liability on a business for the harm the busi-
ness helps cause.119 In the absence of reasons to think that a
legislature required businesses engaged in speech activities to
internalize harms they cause for the very purpose of driving them
out of business, I find it difficult to see a valid First Amendment
objection to a cost-internalization statute. I acknowledge, however,
117. For a discussion of the application of the First Amendment to methods of producing
speech, see Ashutosh Bhagwat, Producing Speech, 56 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1029 (2015).
118. Cf. Pizza Chain Loses Lawsuit over Wreck, KY. NEW ERA, Dec. 18, 1993, at 1D,
available at http://perma.cc/Y45L-LFDM. The news story deals with pizza deliveries, but I
seriously doubt that the result would differ were the business involved a newspaper.
119. I note two qualifications. First, that the intermediary is only one of the causes of
harm—the other being the originator—which seems to me irrelevant for purposes of assessing
legislative power. At least in modern times, legislatures have the power to impose liability on
“but for” causers of harm, not only on proximate causers. Cf. N.Y. Cent. Co. v. White, 243 U.S.
188 (1917) (upholding the constitutionality of a workers’ compensation statute that imposed
liability without fault on employers); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.
1989) (imposing “market share” liability on a defendant who could show that the plaintiff had
not used the defendant’s product). Second, equally irrelevant would be the fact, were it to be
true, that the legislature imposed “but for” liability only on Internet intermediaries. A
legislature is entitled to address problems as they arise, and need not make what Justice
Stevens called an “all or nothing-at-all” choice. Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium,
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 769 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring). But compare Leathers v.
Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (upholding as constitutional a general sales tax, which cable
providers had to pay, but from which newspapers and magazines were exempted), and
Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (finding it constitutional for a legislature to
proceed one step at a time in the context of nonspeech businesses), with Minneapolis Star &
Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983) (holding unconstitutional a
state sales and use tax imposed on ink and paper used in producing newspapers and
magazines, when small publishers were exempt from the tax).
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that the state of the law and of scholarly discussions of the issue
limits my confidence in that conclusion.
Some of the cases hint at an additional concern, that business-
model regulation would be a disguised method of content-based
regulation.120 As always in such situations, the courts have a choice
between two strategies, parallel here to Internet exceptionalism and
standard doctrine with tweaks. They can ask in each specific case
whether there is substantial reason to think that a statute not
framed in content-based terms was adopted for the purpose of
regulating content and whether that purpose is reasonably likely to
actualize in practice, that is, that content regulation will in fact
occur. Or, they can adopt a prophylactic rule banning the use of
some regulatory approaches. Such a rule would single out some
characteristics of the regulatory approach to identify a class of
regulations in which the risk of disguised content-control measures
is high enough. At this point, and partly because of the effect of
§ 230 in blocking the development of Internet regulations, I think
it difficult to say more—for example, to identify the characteristics
that would be built into a prophylactic rule. 
C. The Lurking Problem of State Action
So far this Article has considered the possibility of Internet excep-
tionalism in connection with regulatory rules that might impose
liability on those who disseminate information over the Internet
when the First Amendment precludes the imposition of liability for
disseminating the same information through traditional media. It
has paid some attention to the concern for “censorship by proxy.”121
Censorship by proxy occurs when regulatory rules that operate
appropriately when applied to originators and traditional media, by
creating an acceptable mix of information dissemination and result-
ing harm, have a greater chilling effect when applied to Internet
intermediaries.122 My expository strategy has been to try to present
some ideas in the simplest legal context—when the government acts
120. See Chen, supra note 14, at 1360, 1450-51 (“[C]ourts should remain wary of disguised
efforts to control content.”).
121. Kreimer, supra note 61, at 17.
122. See id. at 65 (discussing how internet intermediaries’ typical prophylactic response
to regulation may lead to users self-censoring protected speech).
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as regulator of speech itself rather than as the regulator of the me-
dia transmitting speech.123 
There is, though, another area in which Internet exceptionalism
(or standard doctrine with tweaks) has featured prominently. The
discussion so far has not dealt with information and ideas that the
intermediary wants to transmit, but those which the government
seeks to suppress because of the harms they cause. Or, more pre-
cisely, the discussion so far has dealt with intermediaries whose
business model rests on transmitting everything that originators
want distributed.
But, of course, intermediaries might have a whole range of differ-
ent business models. One business model might filter out messages
of which the business owners disapprove, without regard to whether
the government does— for example, sexually explicit but nonob-
scene images. Another business owner might inspect incoming mes-
sages and refuse to transmit those expressing “extreme” political
views, as defined by the intermediary in its terms of service. Those
and others might be viable business models. Can the government
direct that intermediaries adopt a particular business model?
Specifically, can the government require that intermediaries trans-
mit everything they receive, preserving the government’s power to
punish the originators of speech whose regulation is consistent with
the First Amendment?124
Here too I aim only to identify the lines of argument available
about Internet exceptionalism and standard doctrine with tweaks.
In general, the arguments fall into two closely related categories.
First, some argue that the government has the power to treat inter-
mediaries as common carriers. At common law, a common carrier,
is an entity that is required to adopt an “all-comers” policy that does
not discriminate (“unjustly,” in the usual formulation) among those
123. Particularly by focusing on legislative and judicial assumptions regarding the nature
and unique aspects of the Internet, such as the exponential accessibility of broad audiences,
Kreimer, supra note 61, at 13, and lower transaction costs in communicating, Balkin, supra
note 75, at 13.
124. Section 230(c) immunizes intermediaries whose business model is an “all comers”
model from liability for disseminating information and ideas where the originator can be
punished without violating the First Amendment, but it does not require any intermediary
to adopt such a business model. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2012).
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who seek to use its service.125 Railroads and hotels are classic
common carriers.
Putting the common-carrier obligation in another way leads us to
the second type of argument. The property rights that common
carriers have are more limited than the property rights of other
businesses, who are entitled (absent otherwise permissible statutory
regulations) to refuse to serve whomever they choose. The state
action doctrine is at its base about the limits the Constitution,
rather than statutes, places on property rights. Consider the classic
case of Shelley v. Kraemer, which found that judicial enforcement of
a property right created by a racially restrictive covenant violated
the Equal Protection Clause even though judicial enforceability is
a defining characteristic of property rights.126
Standard doctrine holds that the government cannot require that
the print media act as common carriers.127 Unreversed precedent,
highly controversial and probably unlikely to be followed by the
Supreme Court were the issue to be presented to it today, allows the
government to treat the broadcast media differently.128 The Turner
Broadcasting decisions adopted intermediate scrutiny to assess
whether certain government “must-carry” requirements for cable
television were constitutionally permissible, and ultimately upheld
the ones at issue.129 The “must-carry” requirements treat cable
systems as limited common carriers. Notably, the four dissenters in
the first Turner Broadcasting case acknowledged, though I suspect
without fully thinking the question through, that “if Congress may
125. See N.J. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchs.’ Bank, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 382-83 (1848)
(finding that a common carrier is in effect a sort of public office and is obligated to carry and
transport all goods offered to it).
126. 334 U.S. 1 (1948). The case is controversial, but, as I have argued in detail elsewhere,
the controversy is ultimately not about whether there was state action but whether the
standards usually relied upon in finding equal protection violations were satisfied. Mark
Tushnet, Shelley v. Kraemer and Theories of Equality, 33 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 383 (1988).
127. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (holding unconstitutional
a state statute requiring that newspapers publish replies to editorials that “assail” a political
candidate’s character).
128. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (holding that an FCC policy re-
quiring that broadcasters make time available for replies to personal attacks did not violate
the First Amendment).
129. Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (rejecting the constitutional challenge
to the “must-carry” requirements); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) (holding
that the appropriate standard was intermediate scrutiny).
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demand that telephone companies operate as common carriers, it
can ask the same of cable companies.”130 
If Congress can demand that cable companies operate as common
carriers, can it ask the same of Internet intermediaries?131 We might
get some guidance from thinking about why legislatures cannot
impose common-carrier obligations on newspapers but can do so on
cable operators. The most obvious reason is that newspapers adopt
what I call “high editorial intervention” business models—the
business model is one in which the publisher supervises editorial
content quite closely—whereas cable operators use a “moderate-to-
low editorial intervention” business model. According to the
Supreme Court in Turner Broadcasting, the must-carry require-
ments implicated the First Amendment because cable operators had
a business model in which they exercised some editorial discretion
in choosing which channels to include in their packages, but not a
lot of discretion.132 Whether Congress could impose common-carrier
obligations on Internet intermediaries might then depend on the
precise business model each intermediary adopted: the First
Amendment would bar imposing those obligations on intermediaries
that exercised high levels of editorial intervention, by extensive
screening for example, and would permit doing so on intermediaries
that exercised significantly lower levels.133
Finally, if we pursue the pure state action route, we will almost
certainly end up with Internet exceptionalism. The difference be-
tween common carrier regulation and regulation pursuant to the
130. 512 U.S. at 684 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
131. I believe that there is no threshold question under modern law of whether a business
has some traditional characteristics associated with common carriers as identified at common
law—those characteristics included that the business provide a socially important service and
that competition in some geographic areas was likely to be limited, though not that the
businesses have a monopoly in the area. Under modern law, legislatures are free to impose
service obligations on any business subject only to the First Amendment and perhaps some
other discrete constitutional limitations on legislative power. The foundational case on this
is Nebbia v. New York. 291 U.S. 502, 552 (1934) (holding that the Constitution permitted the
New York legislature to treat an ordinary business, there supplying milk, as a business
“affected with a public interest,” without regard to traditional definitions of the latter phrase). 
132. Turner Broad. Sys, 512 U.S. at 643-44 (noting that “the provisions interfere with cable
operators’ editorial discretion by compelling them to offer carriage to a certain minimum num-
ber of broadcast stations”).
133. I think the implication of Turner Broadcasting is probably that the relevant
distinction is between high and low levels of editorial intervention, not between business
models with high levels and those with no editorial intervention at all.
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state action doctrine is that the former is legislatively op-
tional—Congress can choose to treat intermediaries as common
carriers—whereas the latter is constitutionally required. Under a
state action approach, the First Amendment not only does not bar
legislatures from regulating intermediaries as common carriers, it
affirmatively requires that courts develop common-carrier-type
regulations.134 A state-action analysis would ask, “Is the rule of
property that allows people to adopt the business model at issue
consistent with the First Amendment?” Under standard First
Amendment doctrine, the answer might well be, “Yes.” The property
rule is the content-neutral rule that private owners of resources
have the right to choose any business model that does not involve
systematic violations of other provisions of law. The tests used to
determine whether a content-neutral rule is consistent with the
First Amendment are usually quite tolerant of such approaches, to
the point when one might fairly characterize the doctrine as finding
constitutionally permissible any rule that is a rational method of
allocating property rights.135 Invoking the state action doctrine to
impose common-carrier obligations on intermediaries would be a
dramatic departure from standard First Amendment doctrine
understood in this way.
But, as always, there is an alternative interpretation available.
The first move would be to focus not on “private property” generally,
but on the property law rules applicable to media enterprises or
even more narrowly to Internet intermediaries.136 With the property
rule narrowed, we would look to standard doctrine. And, at least as
a matter of formally stated doctrine, content-neutral regulations can
be unconstitutional if they have a troublingly large disparate impact
on those who have few private resources of their own to disseminate
134. Note that the state action route changes regulation from being optional to being
required, and it also (subject to some wrinkles not worth exploring in this Article) changes the
institution doing the regulating from the legislature to the courts.
135. See Bd. of Trs. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding that govern-
ment restrictions on commercial speech need not be by the least restrictive means, but only
be a reasonable “fit” between the government’s ends and means); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989) (upholding the constitutionality of a municipal regulation
designed to protect residents from excess noise by requiring performances in public band shell
use city provided sound system and technician).
136. This is another version of the question of identifying the relevant reference class, see
supra note 35 and accompanying text, and as before there is no policy-independent way of
identifying that class.
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their message.137 A rule of property law that allows intermediaries
to choose whatever business model they like might have that kind
of disparate impact.138 If so, we would once again have a rule for the
Internet that was standard doctrine with tweaks.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing set of arguments about the Internet’s distinctive
nature, values, and dangers supports only a rather weak conclusion.
I doubt that we can say either that the Internet’s nature, values,
and dangers justify Internet exceptionalism or that they justify only
the application of standard First Amendment doctrine with appro-
priate tweaks. My predisposition is to say that in such a situation,
judicial deference to legislative choices would require deference to
a legislatively chosen regime of Internet exceptionalism. On reflec-
tion, though, I think that saying so would be mistaken because the
“judicial deference” concern is built into the analysis of specific regu-
lations and cannot be generalized across regulations.139 The lesson,
I think, is that the question, “Internet exceptionalism or standard
doctrine with tweaks?,” may be badly posed. The real question is,
“Internet exceptionalism or standard doctrine with tweaks in
connection with this specific regulation of this specific problem?”
137. The basic cases, which remain good law, are Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S.
496 (1939), and Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
138. Note that the analysis is on the level of the general property rule authorizing choice
of business model, not on the level of asking whether a particular business model has a
troublingly large disparate impact.
139. For example, compare Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002), which
illustrated the absence of judicial deference by holding unconstitutional the application of
bans on child pornography to “virtual” child pornography, with United States v. Williams, 553
U.S. 285 (2008), which illustrated judicial deference by upholding the constitutionality of a
prohibition on “pandering” child pornography when the defendant did not actually possess
child pornography.
